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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

WOMEN’S WORK IS NEVER DONE †

CAROLYN L. WHEELER*
INTRODUCTION
All remedial legislation is a product of the interaction between individuals
outside government who agitate for reform, and individuals inside government
who draft and vote on legislation. Once enacted, statutes are often altered by
the interpretations of enforcement agencies and courts, developed in response
to the arguments of litigants. These interpretations in turn often prompt the
perceived need for amendments to the initial enactment, which begins the
cycle all over again. The legislative enactments needed to rectify the particular
inequities facing women in the workplace have required considerable
tinkering. This “women’s work is never done” in the sense that we have not yet
come up with comprehensive social policies or legislative reforms that address
women’s unique needs flowing from their (often) dual roles as family
caregivers and workers.
The purpose of this article is to trace the evolution and introduction of
three major pieces of legislation addressing discrimination against women in
the workplace and discuss how some of the differences in the impetus for their
introduction and adoption shaped the nature of the legislation itself, and what
consequences that may have had on subsequent enforcement agency and
judicial interpretations of the statutes. Specifically this article will consider the
unique histories and impacts of the Equal Pay Act (EPA) of 1963, the inclusion
of “sex” as a prohibited basis of discrimination in Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) of 1978.

† The usual formulation of this proverb is “A man may work from dusk to dawn, but a
woman’s work is never done.” Here, of course, I am using “work” to refer to the work involved in
achieving lasting political, economic, and social reforms undertaken by organized feminists from
the early 19th century until the present day
* Of Counsel, Katz, Marshall & Banks, a boutique law firm specializing in representation of
plaintiffs in employment discrimination, sexual harassment, civil rights, and whistleblower
matters. Before joining this firm, I spent over two decades as an appellate litigator and supervisor
for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Prior to that, I was a law clerk for three
years to the Honorable Thomas Tang of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
J.D. University of Montana; M.A. and A.B., University of Missouri. Some portions of this article
are expansions on materials I wrote for celebrations of the history of Title VII while working for
the EEOC. wheeler@kmblegal.com.
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Before turning to these enactments of the 1960s and 70s, this article first
gives an overview of the women’s movement that culminated in passage of the
Nineteenth Amendment, granting women suffrage, and the different ideas that
supported women’s suffrage. This survey will then serve as a basis for
examining how those ideas evolved among those who supported passage of an
Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) as opposed to those who devoted their efforts
to social reform to improve the lives of women workers. Understanding the
roots of these ideological differences between ERA proponents and social
reformers is useful because the same ideas about equal rights animated the
discussions of the ERA, the EPA, Title VII, and the PDA in the 1960s and 70s.
Understanding these ideas and arguments will also help to illuminate the limits
of anti-discrimination laws in effecting the changes needed to address fully
women’s unique workplace issues related to pay, harassment, and pregnancy,
and hopefully lead to additional effective strategies to shatter the glass ceiling
that limits women’s employment opportunities.
BACKGROUND ON WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN THE 19TH CENTURY
The women and men who attended the 1848 Seneca Falls convention
endorsed a Declaration of Sentiments and Resolutions, put into final form by
Elizabeth Cady Stanton, which articulated an exhaustive list of grievances:
women were denied access to higher education, the professions, and the pulpit,
as well as equal pay for equal work. If married, they had no property rights;
even the wages they earned belonged legally to their husbands. Women were
subject to a different moral code, yet legally bound to tolerate moral
delinquencies in their husbands. Wives could be punished, and in case of
divorce, a mother had no rights to custody of her children. As the Declaration
concluded, in every way, man “has endeavored to destroy [woman’s]
confidence in her own powers, to lessen her self-esteem, and to make her
willing to lead a dependent and abject life.” Above all, every woman had been
deprived of “her inalienable right to the elective franchise.” 1 There were
eleven resolutions designed to address these inequities, and the most
controversial, the only one not to pass unanimously, was the demand for
suffrage. 2 Despite opposition driven by the fear that the attendees at the
convention would appear ridiculous, Stanton refused to back down from the
demand for suffrage, saying: “To have drunkards, idiots, horse racing rumselling rowdies, ignorant foreigners, and silly boys fully recognized, while we
ourselves are thrust out from all the rights that belong to citizens, is too grossly
insulting to be longer quietly submitted to. The right is ours. We must have

1. ALICE S. ROSSI, THE FEMINIST PAPERS: FROM ADAMS TO DE BEAUVOIR 416 (1974); see
generally id. at 415–20.
2. Id. at 420.
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it.” 3 Frederick Douglass, the only African American at the meeting, spoke
eloquently in favor of suffrage, saying he could not accept the vote as a black
man if women could not also claim that right. 4
After the Civil War, the broad women’s rights agenda narrowed to a
primary focus on suffrage. In 1869, Stanton and Susan B. Anthony formed the
National Woman Suffrage Association, which focused on winning the
franchise at the federal level, while others, led by Lucy Stone, formed the
American Woman Suffrage Association, which focused on work at the state
level; the two groups merged in 1890, forming the National American Woman
Suffrage Association (NAWSA), with Anthony as its first president. 5 In 1913,
Alice Paul founded the Congressional Union, which grew into the National
Woman’s Party in 1916. Members of Paul’s organization focused specifically
on lobbying Congress and they also engaged in militant tactics Paul had
observed the suffragists in England use—marching, picketing the White
House, chaining themselves to the White House fence, getting arrested, and
then going on hunger strikes. 6
Although the central claim for women’s suffrage was the argument for
equality, in the latter years of the struggle advocates began to argue that
women should have the vote because they would bring a moralizing influence
to politics, in other words that women should have the vote not because they
were equal to men, but because they were different and in some respects better.
Historian Aileen Kraditor describes this shift as a move from an “argument
from justice” to an “argument from expediency,” which in later years appealed
to nativist and frankly racist sentiments (arguing, for example that white
women should have the vote to counter the impact of Negro male suffrage
guaranteed by the Fifteenth Amendment). 7 Having deployed every conceivable
argument, the fight for women’s suffrage took over 80 years and 480 battles in
state after state before the women’s groups coalesced behind a national
strategy of fighting for a constitutional amendment, which itself took “19
campaigns with 19 successive Congresses.” 8

3. See SALLY G. MCMILLEN, SENECA FALLS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE WOMEN’S RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 88–89, app. A at 238–39 (David Fischer & James McPherson eds., 2008).
4. See JUDITH WELLMAN, THE ROAD TO SENECA FALLS: ELIZABETH CADY STANTON AND
THE FIRST WOMEN’S RIGHTS CONVENTION 203 (Anne Firor Scott et. al. eds., 2004); see
generally id. at 193, 195; see ELEANOR FLEXNER, CENTURY OF STRUGGLE: THE WOMAN’S
RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 76 (1959).
5. ELLEN CAROL DUBOIS, FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE: THE EMERGENCE OF AN
INDEPENDENT WOMEN’S MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 1848-1869, 189–90, 195–96, 200 (1978).
6. FLEXNER, supra note 4, at 282–83, 285.
7. See AILEEN KRADITOR, THE IDEAS OF THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT 1890-1920,
39, 39 n.1, 138–71 (1965).
8. CARRIE CHAPMAN CATT & NETTIE ROGERS SHULER, WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND
POLITICS, 107 (1993) (explaining that “fifty-six campaigns of referenda to male voters; 480
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Once women obtained the right to vote, what became of the earlier list of
goals of the women’s rights movement? Several of the goals of the original
Declaration of Sentiments were achieved in that women had broader
educational and professional opportunities and many common law restrictions
had been removed. 9 As for any unfinished agenda items, for the most part they
lost their hold on women’s imaginations. Many of the older generations of
feminists had died; Stanton died in 1902; Anthony in 1906. Those who were
still alive split and followed a number of diverse paths after their success in
winning the right to vote.
Carrie Chapman Catt, the president in 1919 of the mainstream suffrage
organization, the NAWSA, formed the League of Women Voters (LWV),
dedicated to educating newly enfranchised women voters about political
issues. She remained active in this organization until her death in 1947. 10
The hardcore feminists in the National Woman’s Party (NWP) focused on
passage of the ERA, believing that the vote had been only one step toward full
emancipation for women, which could only be achieved through the
eradication of all legal distinctions between men and women. These feminists
had no patience for the ground game of fighting state by state to eliminate
specific legal barriers affecting women. 11
Other supporters of suffrage, identified by various historians as social
feminists or social reformers, 12 continued their long-standing campaigns for
legislation to protect the welfare of women and children. A leading reformer in
this category was Florence Kelly, who worked with the National Consumers’
League (NCL), formed in 1898. 13 Labor reform had a long history of efforts to
regulate working conditions, and those efforts were not gender-specific. One
central goal of workers from the 1820s on was to put limits on the workday,
and by the 1870s thirteen states had passed ten-hour workday statues. 14 These
efforts suffered a setback when the U.S. Supreme Court struck down New

campaigns to get Legislatures to submit suffrage amendments to voters; 47 campaigns to get State
constitutional conventions to write woman suffrage into state constitutions; 277 campaigns to get
State party conventions to include woman suffrage planks; 30 campaigns to get presidential party
conventions to adopt woman suffrage planks in party platforms, and 19 campaigns with 19
successive Congresses”), quoted in FLEXNER, supra note 4, at 173.
9. WILLIAM H. CHAFE, THE AMERICAN WOMAN: HER CHANGING SOCIAL, ECONOMIC,
AND POLITICAL ROLES, 1920-1970 22 (1972).
10. Id. at 34–35.
11. See id. at 112–32.
12. Id. at 113–14; WILLIAM L. O’NEILL, EVERYONE WAS BRAVE 51–52 (1969).
13. See generally KATHRYN KISH SKLAR, FLORENCE KELLEY AND THE NATION’S WORK:
THE RISE OF WOMEN’S POLITICAL CULTURE 310–315 (1995).
14. Ten-Hour Day Movement, ST. JAMES ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LABOR HISTORY WORLDWIDE:
MAJOR EVENTS IN LABOR HISTORY AND THEIR IMPACT (2004), http://www.encyclopedia.com/
history/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/ten-hour-day-movement.
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York’s law setting a ten-hour day for bakers as violating the liberty of contract
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment in Lochner v. New York. 15
Before Lochner, many reformers had worked at the state level to enact
protective legislation for women and children, such as the Illinois Factory Act
of 1893, which regulated sweatshop conditions, limited hours for women, and
prohibited child labor. The eight-hour limitation for women was struck down
by the Illinois Supreme Court in 1895 in Ritchie v. People, 16 based on the same
rationale the U.S. Supreme Court later adopted in Lochner. Undeterred, Kelley
continued the battle on the national level when she became general secretary of
the NCL. The NCL worked with other groups, such as the Women’s Trade
Union League (WTUL), to win other such reforms and succeeded in enacting
hours limits and restrictions on night work for women in eighteen states. These
reformers saw legislation protecting women and children as a vehicle, or
wedge, for winning reforms that would ultimately benefit men as well.
Oregon’s ten-hour law for women workers was addressed in Muller v.
Oregon, 17 and the Court accepted that the state’s interest in protecting the
health of mothers superseded the freedom of contract doctrine. The Court said
that “history discloses the fact that woman has always been dependent upon
man,” and that a woman, like a child, “has been looked upon in the courts as
needing especial care” and “[s]he is properly placed in a class by herself, and
legislation designed for her protection may be sustained.” 18 After Muller, the
NCL relied on its rationale in fights for minimum-wage laws in a number of
states, and state courts upheld those wage laws as well as the protective laws
setting hours limits and night work bans. 19 The NCL, true to its initial concept,
then used Muller to argue for a maximum hours law for all workers in Bunting
v. Oregon, 20 in which the Court upheld a ten-hour day for both men and
women.
Conflicts between advocates of the ERA and protective legislation raged
throughout the 1920s. In essence, the two groups had diametrically opposite
conceptions of equality. The NWP and ERA proponents saw protective
legislation as discriminatory and as overtly harming women’s economic
opportunities because such laws effectively restricted women’s access to
better-paying jobs and shifts, reinforcing their being stuck in lower-paying sexsegregated jobs. ERA proponents advocated equal access to all jobs on equal

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

See generally Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
See generally Ritchie v. People, 40 N.E. 454 (Ill. 1895).
See generally Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
Id. at 421–22.
WILLIAM L. O’NEILL, FEMINISM IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 152 (1989).
See generally Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917).
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terms for all. 21 The social reformers, or protectionists, based their arguments
on women’s differences from men, arguing that women’s unique childbearing
and childrearing responsibilities necessitated special treatment in the
workplace. 22 Reformers had supported suffrage primarily on the ground that
women needed the vote to be able to effectuate other needed reforms. For
example, Kelley told a congressional committee in 1910 of a failure to get
New York to appropriate money for factory inspections and said that the
mayor of New York told her she should stop wasting her time because she had
“not a voter in [her] constituency” and both she and the legislators knew that. 23
But once women won the vote, these reformers were ready to attend to their
primary goals.
The ERA proponents, such as Alice Paul, were initially willing to include
exemptions from the ERA that would save protective legislation. In the end
however, because many in the NWP were opposed to protective legislation, the
ERA did not include this language. By mid-1922 it was apparent that there was
no reconciliation possible between the two groups, and the NCL, the LWV,
and the WTUL all publicly announced their opposition to the “blanket equal
rights amendment.” 24 The NWP expressed its disagreement with the reformers
by filing an amicus brief in the Supreme Court in Adkins v. Children’s
Hospital, 25 arguing against a minimum wage law for women in the District of
Columbia. 26 The Court agreed with the NWP’s position and held the law to be
unconstitutional, restoring the Lochner freedom of contract standard in the
wage context. 27 The Court emphasized that Muller had not overruled Lochner
because wages are different from hours. 28 The Court also said that the cases
justifying special protection for women were no longer relevant, because “[in]
view of the great—not to say revolutionary—changes which have taken place
since [Muller], in the contractual, political, and civil status of women,
culminating in the Nineteenth Amendment, it is not unreasonable to say that
these differences have now come almost, if not quite, to the vanishing point.” 29

21. Historical Overview of the National Woman’s Party, Library of Congress,
https://www.loc.gov/collections/static/women-of-protest/images/history.pdf.
22. CHAFE, supra note 9, at 129.
23. O’NEILL, supra note 12, at 53–54.
24. Equal Rights Amendment and Protective Legislation, ST. JAMES ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
LABOR HISTORY WORLDWIDE: MAJOR EVENTS IN LABOR HISTORY AND THEIR IMPACT (2004),
http://www.encyclopedia.com/history/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/equal-rights
-amendment-and-protective-legislation.
25. See generally Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
26. CHAFE, supra note 9, at 127.
27. Adkins, 261 U.S. at 560–562.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 553.
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Later in 1923, the NWP held a conference in Seneca Falls, New York, to
commemorate the 75th anniversary of the Declaration of Sentiments and launch
the ERA, then introduced it in Congress in December 1923. Paul drafted the
ERA in 1923 with the simple language, “Men and women shall have equal
rights throughout the United States and every place subject to its
jurisdiction.” 30 The NWP was joined in its advocacy for the ERA only by the
National Federation of Business and Professional Women’s Clubs whose
members included professional women and skilled workers who had been
adversely affected by protective legislation. The NWP’s biggest and most
formidable opponent was the Department of Labor’s (DOL’s) Women’s
Bureau, but the ERA was also opposed by the NCL, the LWV, the Women’s
Christian Temperance Union, the WTUL, the National Association of
University Women, the PTA, the YWCA, and the National Federation of
Federal Employees. 31
Women’s Bureau director Mary Anderson was a key figure in the debate.
She was a former factory worker and long-time proponent of labor legislation.
At a conference in 1926 the NWP passed a resolution directing the Bureau to
investigate and explore the effects of the protective legislation, but the final
report, The Effects of Labor Legislation on the Employment of Women,
constituted an overwhelming and somewhat suspect endorsement. 32 This report
defined the Bureau’s stance on the issue until 1938 when the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) was passed, extending at least some protections to
covered workers regardless of gender. 33
Notably, by the 1960s, even proponents of this type of legislation had
begun to see that it had its downsides in limiting women’s opportunities. But
they did not want to repeal the laws, just update them to provide necessary
protections without limiting work and career opportunities. For example, in
1965, at a White House conference, Mary Keyserling, then head of the DOL
Women’s Bureau said: “[T]hese laws were put on the books by women’s
organizations in the interest of women . . . [and] sought to eliminate the real
abuses which prevailed widely in industry. . . . [T]he freeing of women from

30. THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT, http://www.equalrightsamendment.org/ (last visited
Apr. 6, 2017). The ERA was later reworded to say “Equality under the law shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.” It passed in Congress in 1972,
but did not receive the necessary number of state votes for ratification; it has been reintroduced
every year since then. Paul died in 1977 without seeing the ERA passed.
31. Kathryn Kish Sklar, Why Were Most Politically Active Women Opposed to the ERA in
the 1920s?, in RIGHTS OF PASSAGE: THE PAST AND PRESENT OF THE ERA 25 (Joan Hoff-Wilson
ed., 1986).
32. CHAFE, supra note 9, at 119–120.
33. Id.
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employment discrimination does not demand that they all have identical
treatment.” 34
EQUAL PAY ACT
Congress held hearings for eighteen years on the issue of pay
discrimination against women, without producing any legislation. In 1961,
President Kennedy ordered the establishment of the President’s Commission
on the Status of Women to examine and recommend remedies to combat
“prejudices and outmoded customs [that] act as barriers to the full realization
of women’s basic rights.” 35Although the Commission made many
recommendations, the only one that led to the immediate introduction of
legislation was a recommendation for equal pay. 36 The tipping point in favor of
this legislation after World War II was the voluminous testimony from unions,
various women’s groups, and religious groups, and the evidence that the pay
gap was widening: in 1955 there was a 64% differential, in 1961 it was 59%.
In support of the proposed Equal Pay Act, Esther Peterson, Assistant Secretary
for the DOL, and head of the Women’s Bureau, noted that women were
discouraged from entering the workforce because employers undervalued their
work—so the pay gap leads to underutilization of good labor. As one scholar
has observed, this argument probably was needed to persuade Congress to
enact the legislation, but others “saw the real value of the EPA as dignitary in
nature, sending the message that gender equality was a priority for those at the
highest levels of government.” 37
It should be noted that Peterson subscribed to the views the Women’s
Bureau had espoused in the 1920s, that the ERA was an unnecessary and
pernicious proposal, and that the problems of women workers were best
addressed through the type of specific legislative reforms the social reform
feminists had advocated over the prior decades. 38 Peterson’s twin goals upon
being appointed by President Kennedy were to get the EPA passed, and to
derail passage of the ERA. 39 To accomplish passage of the EPA, Peterson
organized a concerted lobbying campaign using her contacts and expertise
from her work as a lobbyist for the AFL-CIO. 40 This campaign took two years
and included two hearings in the House and one in the Senate. The final bill
34. EEOC, White House Conference on Equal Employment Opportunity, Discrimination
Because of Sex 22, 26 (Aug. 19-20, 1965) (panel transcript available in the EEOC Library,
Washington, D.C.).
35. JUDITH HOLE & ELLEN LEVINE, REBIRTH OF FEMINISM 18 (1974).
36. Id.
37. Juliene James, The Equal Pay Act in the Courts: A De Facto White-Collar Exemption,
79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1873, 1878–79 (2004).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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was narrower than she had hoped, and applied to only 61% of the female labor
force, but by the time it was signed into law, members of Congress had heard a
great deal about the problems of women workers. 41 As a result, in part, of the
origin of this piece of legislation and the prolonged debate over its terms, the
scope of the EPA is quite narrow, its strictures are very demanding, and its
remedies are narrowly tailored. The EPA mandates equal wages for men and
women doing equal work except where an employer makes a differential
payment based on a seniority system, a merit system, a system based on
productivity of workers, or “any other factor other than sex.” 42
In its only decision construing the EPA, Corning Glass Works v. Brennan,
the Supreme Court noted that:
Congress’ purpose in enacting the Equal Pay Act was to remedy what was
perceived to be a serious and endemic problem of employment discrimination
in private industry - the fact that the wage structure of “many segments of
American industry has been based on an ancient but outmoded belief that a
man, because of his role in society, should be paid more than a woman even
though his duties are the same.” The solution adopted was quite simple in
43
principle: to require that “equal work will be rewarded by equal wages.”

In Corning, the Court explained that a plaintiff bears the burden of proving
that the employer pays different wages to employees of opposite sexes “for
equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and
responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions.” 44
The Court also made clear that if a plaintiff makes that showing the burden of
proof shifts to the employer to show that the differential is justified under one
of the Act’s four exceptions. 45 The Court held in that case that a wage
differential arising “simply because men would not work at the low rates paid
women” was illegal under the EPA, because the differential was not based on a
factor other than sex. 46 In another significant interpretation of the statute, the
Third Circuit held in Schultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 47 that jobs only have to be
“substantially equal” not identical. The case involved female “selectorpackers” and male “selector-packer-stackers” who were paid more and the
court held they were sufficiently similar to support an EPA claim. 48

41. Jo Freeman, How “Sex” Got into Title VII: Persistent Opportunism as a Maker of Public
Policy, 9 LAW & INEQ. 163–184 (1990-1991).
42. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2016).
43. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195–196 (1974) (internal citations
omitted).
44. Id. at 195–197.
45. Id. at 197.
46. Id. at 204–05.
47. See generally Schultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1970).
48. Id.
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How much has the EPA helped women workers? According to information
presented by the President’s National Equal Pay Task Force in June 2013, in
the 60s and 70s the Department of Labor (DOL) recovered $162,063,460 for
over 269,601 workers (by 1978 when enforcement responsibility for the statute
passed to the EEOC). 49 In the 80s and 90s, the EEOC obtained a $42.4 million
settlement from General Motors and UAW to resolve a Commissioner charge
of a pattern and practice of race and sex discrimination. 50 In 1985, the EEOC
entered into a consent decree with Allstate on an EPA claim for sales agents,
obtaining $5 million for 3200 women; and the EEOC’s suit against Teachers
Insurance and Annuity Equity Fund resulted in redoing pension benefits in a
sex neutral manner for over 800,000 women. From 2000 to 2009, the EEOC
found cause in 829 charges and recovered $52.7 million through administrative
enforcement. 51 The EEOC also litigated against Morgan Stanley and obtained
$54 million for sex-based discrimination in compensation, promotion, and
other aspects of employment. 52 Further, according to EEOC Chair Yang’s
statement on January 29, 2016, the EEOC has recovered $85 million in
monetary relief for those who have faced pay discrimination based on sex. 53
Although the oft-noted pay gap has narrowed from 59% to roughly 78% in
2013, 54 it is not immediately apparent that the EPA has contributed
significantly to that change.
As the Task Force Report acknowledged, a large part of the wage gap
between men and women is attributable to occupational segregation. 44% of
men are in occupations that are 75% male, while only 6% of women are in
those occupations. 55 These male dominated occupations include manufacturing
salespersons, farmers and ranchers, architects, transportation supervisors,
cutting workers, detectives and investigators, and computer programmers. In
2010, nine of the ten most common occupations for women were majority
female – administrative assistants, nurses, cashiers, retail salespersons, nursing
and home health aides, waitresses, retail sales supervisors and managers,
customer service representatives, and house cleaners. 56 The explanations for
these patterns of employment range from workers’ choices to the effects of

49. Fifty Years After the Equal Pay Act: Assessing the Past, Taking Stock of the Future,
National Equal Pay Task Force 13 (June 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/de
fault/files/equalpay/equal_pay_task_force_progress_report_june_2013_new.pdf (hereinafter
“Task Force Report”).
50. Task Force Report, supra note 50.
51. Task Force Report, supra note 50.
52. Task Force Report, supra note 50.
53. EEOC, Remarks of Chair Jenny R. Yang at the White House Equal Pay Event (Jan. 29,
2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/chair-remarks-1-19-2016.cfm.
54. Task Force Report, supra note 50, at 7.
55. Task Force Report, supra note 50, at 6–7.
56. Task Force Report, supra note 50, at 24.
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discrimination. 57 Workers’ choices could explain segregation because one
group is more “willing to accept unpleasant or dangerous work, longer hours,
or physical strain in return for higher wages” or women could “enter
occupations that require less investment and result in less earnings growth
because they expect abbreviated and discontinuous labor force activity.” 58 On
the other hand, the Report notes that “historical patterns of exclusion and
discrimination paint a more complex picture” because employers’ “outright
refusal to hire, severe harassment of women in non-traditional jobs, or policies
and practices that screen qualified women out of positions but are not jobrelated” could explain segregation. 59 Whatever the cause of occupational
segregation, it is apparent that the EPA, with its emphasis on equal pay for
equal work, can never adequately address this basic cause of the pay gap.
One of several significant difficulties in obtaining relief under the EPA
initially was that, because the EPA was an amendment to the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA), the exemptions in that statute applied, so the EPA, like
the FLSA, exempted workers employed “in a bona fide executive,
administrative, or professional capacity.” 60 Thus, while the EPA benefited
blue-collar workers, it provided no assistance to white-collar workers. This
exemption was lifted by the Education Amendments of 1972. 61 These 1972
Amendments are much better known as Title IX, which prohibits exclusion
from participation in educational programs or activities on the basis of sex. 62
As one commentator has wryly noted, “Though support for this amendment
did come from the education sector, one might rightly question why it was
buried in an omnibus bill nine years after the EPA’s enactment, the purpose of
which was to promote the advancement of postsecondary education through
subsidies to institutions and ‘for other purposes.’” 63Although lawyers and
litigants educated themselves about the removal of the executive exemption
from the EPA, and women in professional and executive positions are now
technically able to bring claims, courts have interpreted the Act so narrowly as
to make white-collar women’s claims almost impossible to win. “[L]ack of
success in the courtroom presents a serious impediment to the EPA’s mandate
of equal pay for equal work.” 64 The reason the FLSA originally exempted
administrative, professional, and executive workers was that white-collar jobs
were considered too different, too independent, and too prestigious to be
57. Task Force Report, supra note 50, at 26, 28.
58. Task Force Report, supra note 50, at 26.
59. Task Force Report, supra note 50, at 26.
60. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2014).
61. Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 906(b)(1), 86 Stat. 235, 375
(1972) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (removing § 206(d)(1) from exemption)).
62. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (1972).
63. James, supra note 37, at 1873, 1882 n. 47.
64. James, supra note 37, at 1876.
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measured against blue-collar counterparts. 65 In other words, requiring overtime
pay for individuals in these executive jobs would have created administrative
difficulties because such jobs do not lend themselves to work-spreading, so
effective regulation is difficult, and in addition it was thought that such higher
level workers make enough money and have enough control over their hours
that they should not be able to tax employers for overtime when they work at
their own discretion. None of those considerations are applicable in a challenge
to pay discrimination based on sex, but courts still seem to apply the proof
requirements as if workers in executive and professional positions cannot be
meaningfully compared. 66
The difficulties of establishing a prima facie case when challenging pay
discrimination in a professional job is illustrated by the EEOC’s inability to
challenge such discrimination against female lawyers working for the New
York Port Authority in EEOC v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.67
The court of appeals upheld the dismissal of the EEOC’s complaint because,
although EEOC had evidence that male and female supervisory attorneys for
the Authority were fungible under the employer’s policies and could be moved
from one legal department to another, were subject to the same time pressures
and deadlines, used the same legal analytical skills regardless of their practice
area, had the same job code, had salaries determined on the same “maturity
curve,” and were evaluated on identical criteria, that evidence was insufficient
to show they were engaged in equal work. 68
Another difficulty for plaintiffs who might challenge unequal pay is that
employees usually do not know what others are paid, and many employers
specifically prohibit discussion of compensation. This reality affected Lilly
Ledbetter when she attempted to sue Goodyear Tire under Title VII for
underpaying her compared to men over the course of her employment.
Goodyear based pay on performance evaluations, and Ledbetter contended that
several of her supervisors in the past had given her poor evaluations because of
her sex, so that by the end of her employment she was earning significantly
less than her male colleagues. She had never known about the pay differential
over the years. Although a jury found in her favor, the Eleventh Circuit
reversed, holding that Title VII pay claims cannot be based on discriminatory
events that occurred before the last pay decision affecting pay during the 300
day charge filing period. The Supreme Court agreed and rejected her claim
because she had not challenged the intentionally discriminatory decision to pay
her less within 300 days of the original decision. 69 Justice Ginsburg found the

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

James, supra note 37, at 1889.
James, supra note 37, at 1892–98.
See generally EEOC v. Port. Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 768 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2014).
Id. at 250–52.
See generally Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2017]

WOMEN’S WORK IS NEVER DONE

71

Court’s rule to be out of step with workplace realities and the remedial
purposes of Title VII, and ended her dissenting opinion with an admonition
that “[o]nce again, the ball is in Congress’ court. As in 1991, the Legislature
may act to correct this Court’s parsimonious reading of Title VII.” 70 Although
the Ledbetter case addressed the timing rules for claims under Title VII, the
facts suggested a difficulty that a woman would have in asserting an EPA
violation as well, namely that it is sometimes very difficult to know whether
one’s compensation is based on discriminatory criteria because one does not
know what others are paid. 71
The Court’s draconian rule led in very short order to passage of the Lilly
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, 72 which restored the prior rules on timeliness
of such challenges. This amendment, however, did not alleviate the underlying
problem of being ignorant of the existence of a claim of discrimination in
compensation. In an amendment that would address that difficulty (and others),
members of Congress have introduced the Paycheck Fairness Act, repeatedly
since 1997. 73 This bill would amend the EPA to permit punishment of
employers for retaliating against workers who share wage information, allow
for punitive damages, and put the burden on employers asserting a “factor
other than sex” defense to prove that the differential is tied to a legitimate
business necessity. Although this bill would enhance the protections and
remedies of the EPA, it cannot rectify the pay disparities that result from
occupational segregation, nor does it do anything to lessen the difficulty of
establishing a prima facie case in administrative, executive, and professional
jobs.
TITLE VII
Although the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was drafted by the Department of
Justice at President Kennedy’s request principally as a response to compelling
demands for racial justice and equality, from its inception the employment
provisions in Title VII also prohibited discrimination on the bases of religion,
sex, and national origin. The statute says it shall be unlawful for employers,
labor unions, or employment agencies to discriminate against an individual in
hiring, firing, compensation, or terms, conditions, or privileges of employment

70. Id. at 661 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting).
71. The time limitations for an EPA claim are different however, in that a suit may be
brought not later than 2 years or 3 years (if willful) after the date of the last event constituting the
alleged violation. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(c)(1)–(2) (2008). Also, there is no charge filing requirement
as there is under Title VII.
72. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–12, 123 Stat 5 (amending 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)).
73. See Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 2199, 113th Cong. (2014), https://www.congress.gov/bill/
113th-congress/senate-bill/2199.
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because of the individual’s “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 74 The
statute also makes it unlawful “to limit, segregate, or classify” employees or
applicants on any of those bases in a way that deprives them of employment
opportunities or adversely affects their status. 75 The inclusion of sex as a
prohibited basis in Title VII presents a classic example of the working of the
democratic process in which individuals may vote for a measure for a variety
of reasons, with consequences expected by none.
The conventional view of how sex was added to Title VII is that a southern
opponent of civil rights legislation introduced the “sex amendment” in hopes
of derailing passage of the Civil Rights Act. 76 While it is true that concern with
sex discrimination had none of the immediate and visceral impact that concern
with race discrimination had in 1963, and there was no sweeping popular
pressure for eradicating sex discrimination—no marches, no boycotts, no
demonstrations, and no firehoses or bombs used against proponents of equal
rights—still it is patronizing, dismissive, and above all, inaccurate, to say the
amendment to include sex in the bill was a fluke, a joke, or an accident.
The fluke or accident myth arose primarily because of the absence of any
committee report or other formal record of the legislative history. 77 This
absence is attributed to the presumed fact that the sponsor was trying to
sabotage the entire Civil Rights Act of 1964 by engaging in a parliamentary
ploy that happened to become law. This myth has been debunked by numerous
scholars. 78 In fact, “sex” was added to Title VII after calculated lobbying by
women’s groups, and with the support of all but one female member of the
House of Representatives. 79
The history of the amendment adding sex is not as sparse as it was once
thought to be. The proposal to include sex originated with the NWP, the very
group that had been lobbying for the ERA every year since 1923, and which
had sought to include sex in every civil rights bill considered by Congress for
forty years. 80 The NWP asked three members of Congress to introduce an
amendment to add sex to the Civil Rights Act: Katherine St. George of New
York, Martha Griffiths of Michigan, and Howard Smith of Virginia, and all
agreed to do what they could. 81 Both St. George and Smith opposed passage of
the Act, and were concerned that their sponsorship of the amendment would be

74. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2012).
76. Rachel Osterman, Comment, Origins of a Myth: Why Courts, Scholars, and the Public
Think Title VII’s Ban on Sex Discrimination Was an Accident, 20 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 409,
409 (2009); Freeman, supra note 41, at 163, 177.
77. Osterman, supra note 76, at 416–424.
78. Osterman, supra note 76, at 410.
79. Osterman, supra note 76, at 410.
80. Osterman, supra note 76, at 414.
81. Freeman, supra note 41, at 174.
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suspect. 82 Griffiths thought Smith’s sponsorship would guarantee supporting
votes from southern Democrats, and he ultimately agreed to propose the
amendment. 83 The NWP’s Paul was pleased with his sponsorship because he
had been a friend and supporter of the ERA, having voted for it every year
when it was introduced. 84 Smith apparently agreed to do it because he believed
sex discrimination was a serious problem, and that white women would be
disadvantaged compared to black women if there were no sex amendment. 85
That appeal to white supremacy was similar to the arguments advanced by
suffragists at the turn of the century. 86 Smith introduced his amendment by
saying, “it is indisputable fact that all throughout industry women are
discriminated against in that just generally speaking they do not get as high
compensation.” 87 Then he read a letter from a “lady” with a “real grievance”
who complained that the imbalance between the number of men and women
prevents women from attaining happiness. 88 This evoked laughter, and led
observers to dub the debate “Ladies Day” in the House. 89 Representative
Emmanuel Celler responded to Smith, saying that women were not a minority
in his household even though he always had the last words, and those words
were “Yes, dear.” 90 The laughter and jocularity subsided as a serious
discussion ensued. 91
On the floor of the House the debate was not extensive, but all the
principal arguments for and against a prohibition on sex discrimination were
thoroughly aired. Its opponents were concerned that the amendment would be
a threat to protective legislation premised on the view that women “‘were
marginal participants in labor markets’” and “‘were especially deserving of
public protection as actual or potential mothers.’” 92 The opponents relied
heavily on the fact that members of the labor and women’s rights communities
as well as the President’s Commission on the Status of Women were opposed
to any law that would undermine the special protections of women. 93 Peterson,
82. Id. at 174–75.
83. Id. at 175.
84. Louis Menand, The Sex Amendment: How women got in on the Civil Rights Act., THE
NEW YORKER, July 21, 2014, available at http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/07/21/sexamendment.
85. Osterman, supra note 76, at 412–13.
86. Kraditor, supra note 7, at 138-185.
87. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 3213
(1968).
88. Id. at 3213–14.
89. Freeman, supra note 41, at 176.
90. Osterman, supra note 76, at 412.
91. Id.
92. Cary Franklin, Inventing the “Traditional Concept” of Sex Discrimination, 125 HARV.
L. REV. 1307, 1321 (2012) (citation omitted).
93. Id. at 1321.
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Deputy Secretary of Labor and head of the Women’s Bureau, acknowledged
that women experienced discrimination in employment but agreed with the
conclusion of the President’s Commission that “discrimination based on sex
. . . involve[d] problems sufficiently different from discrimination based on
[the] other factors listed to make separate treatment preferable.” 94 As she
described it, it was preferable to have “specific bills for specific ills.” 95
Peterson and other feminists who had fought for protective legislation for
women consistently opposed the ERA and initially opposed inclusion of sex in
Title VII for the same reason—because they feared that the principle of equal
treatment under the law would undermine the few gains women had made. 96
They also thought the EPA had addressed the principal evil plaguing women in
the workforce and that the Civil Rights Act should not be cluttered up with the
inclusion of sex. 97 The Commission’s Committee on Home and Community
had stated that care of home and children are the “unique responsibility” of
women, concluding that “[t[his is not debatable as a philosophy. It is and will
remain a fact of life.” 98
Opponents also expressed fear that a law prohibiting sex discrimination in
employment would have an adverse effect on the regulation of traditional sex
and family roles, and to assist in maintaining proper patriarchal control of the
family, Representative Robert Griffin proposed an amendment that would bar a
married women from filing a sex discrimination claim unless her husband were
unemployed. 99 The only woman in the House who spoke against the
amendment was Edith Green, Democrat of Oregon. 100 She said there was ten
times as much discrimination based on race, as on sex, questioned the motives
behind the amendment, and worried it would clutter the bill and might
undermine passage. 101
Proponents of the amendment did not disagree that adding sex to Title VII
would undermine protective legislation and traditional family roles, rather they
said that was the whole point. 102 Representative Martha Griffiths spoke at
length about the deleterious effects of protective legislation, saying that these
laws kept women in low-paying jobs. 103 Representative St. George made the
same argument, emphasizing that limitations on women’s ability to work late
at night means they are not able to make the higher pay associated with such

94.
95.
96.
97.
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99.
100.
101.
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Freeman, supra note 41, at 172.
Freeman, supra note 41, at 166.
Osterman, supra note 76, at 419.
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work. 104 Both female representatives said the history of subordination of
women in the American legal system was not a tradition of which to be
proud. 105
The vote is what ultimately decided whether sex would be added to Title
VII. 106 Members of Congress, who had listened to Peterson’s presentations for
two years before passing the EPA in 1963, and who listened to the arguments
of their female colleagues, were apparently inclined to believe that women
faced real discrimination in employment; the women in Congress were
convinced by the derisive laughter of their male colleagues, if nothing else,
that including sex was both appropriate and necessary. 107 As Representative
Griffiths said, “[I]f there had been any necessity to have pointed out that
women were a second-class sex, the laughter would have proved it.” 108 In the
end, the amendment passed in the House 168 to 133, and the bill itself passed
290 to 130. 109
When the bill went to the Senate, President Johnson, Peterson, and various
women’s groups rallied to support the bill with sex included. 110 Since they no
longer feared that the amendment was a ploy to derail passage of the Civil
Rights Act, they no longer opposed its inclusion. 111 Although Senator Everett
Dirksen wanted to take sex out of the Act, the NWP continued to advocate for
it and Margaret Chase Smith, one of only two women in the Senate, supported
it. 112 In the end the Senate passed the bill with sex included, the House adopted
the Senate’s version after one hour of debate, and President Johnson signed the
bill the same day, on July 2, 1964. 113 Since sex was removed from all the other
titles of the Civil Rights Act, it seems safe to say that a majority in Congress
thought discrimination against women in the workplace was a real concern that
justified legislative action. 114
But it also seems safe to say that few who were considering the wisdom of
outlawing sex discrimination in 1963-64 could have foreseen where the sex
amendment would lead. In the first year after enactment, one-third of charges
filed with the EEOC alleged sex discrimination. 115 Title VII was definitely
born out of the racial tension of the time, but the unexpected inclusion of sex in
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the statute quickly led women workers and the newly emerging women’s
movement of the late 1960s to take advantage of the opportunity to pursue
equality by filing charges with the EEOC and then by pursuing their claims in
the courts. 116 The leadership of the EEOC was unprepared to deal with claims
of sex discrimination, and had a significant role in fostering the myth that sex
had been introduced into the statute by accident. 117 EEOC leaders said it was a
“fluke,” “conceived out of wedlock,” and contended that they had a number of
problems of interpretation because there was no legislative history. 118 They
also stated that sex discrimination does not have “the same moral overtones” as
race “and there are few women’s protest organizations.” 119 An EEOC official
described the prohibition of sex discrimination as an “orphan” and worried
about how to apply the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense in
cases of sex discrimination. 120 The defense permits an employer to
discriminate on the basis of sex if it can prove that sex is a “qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business.” 121
EEOC officials suggested the BFOQ defense raises the “bunny” problem,
meaning that Playboy Clubs might be forced to hire men as Playboy
bunnies. 122
When the EEOC promulgated its first guidelines on whether weight-lifting
restrictions are legal under Title VII, at the end of 1965, the agency said it had
to proceed with caution because it had no legislative history to guide its
interpretations. 123 It stated that it issued guidelines as “an effort to temper the
bare language of the statute with common sense and a sympathetic
understanding of the position and needs of women workers.” 124 The guidelines

116. Menand, supra note 84.
117. Osterman, supra note 76, at 416.
118. Osterman, supra note 76, at 416.
119. Osterman, supra note 76, at 416.
120. Osterman, supra note 76, at 416.
121. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2012).
122. Osterman, supra note 76, at 416–17.
123. Notably, there is even less history to explain the inclusion of religion in Title VII. There
is no mention in the history of any debate or discussion whatsoever. The only mention of religion
concerned the amendment to exempt religious corporations and religiously affiliated educational
entities from the religious mandate of the Act, EEOC, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND
XI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 3197–212 (1968), and a proposed amendment “that
would have permitted employers to refuse to hire atheists,” id. at 3101–02. Despite this absence
of any indication of congressional intent, in 1966, EEOC promulgated guidelines on religious
discrimination stating that an employer has an obligation to accommodate employees’ religious
practices unless to do so would create a “serious inconvenience to the conduct of the business.”
29 C.F.R § 1605.2(b) (2017).
124. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 30 Fed. Reg. 14,926, 14,927 (Dec. 2,
1965).
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stated that weight restrictions will be honored except where the limit is set at
an unreasonably low level. 125
The EEOC’s dismissive attitude toward the prohibition on sex
discrimination not only helped to foster the myth that sex was added as a joke,
it also led directly to the formation of the National Organization for Women
which petitioned the EEOC to take the provision seriously. 126 Representative
Griffiths spoke on the House floor in 1966 to criticize the EEOC’s use of the
legislative history as a rationale for its lax enforcement, saying “I reject that
slur on Congress” and arguing that there was no need for an extensive
legislative discussion on discrimination against women because the problems
had been thoroughly discussed for the preceding two years during debates on
the EPA. 127 Although EEOC leaders professed that they were unsure about
what to do, most scholars see this as a period of massive resistance to
enforcement by the EEOC. 128 One Commissioner said the sex provision “is
mysterious and difficult to understand and control” but business leaders and
feminists were demanding that the EEOC take a position on the viability of
protective legislation as well as the legality of sex-specific classified
advertising in newspapers. NOW and other feminists succeeded by the end of
the 1960s in convincing the EEOC to take positions on gender that were as
aggressive as its early positions on race discrimination. 129 Thus, in 1969, the
EEOC issued guidelines stating that sex-segregated job advertising violated
Title VII and that pregnancy discrimination constituted discrimination because
of sex, and it also adopted a strong stance against protective legislation. 130
The courts agreed with the EEOC’s new-found understanding of the scope
and meaning of discrimination on the basis of sex. In Weeks v. Southern Bell
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 131 a case involving a weight lifting restriction, the
court rejected the company’s explanation for its restriction, and held that:
Title VII rejects just this type of romantic paternalism as unduly Victorian and
instead vests individual women with the power to decide whether or not to take
on unromantic tasks. Men have always had the right to determine whether the
incremental increase in remuneration for strenuous, dangerous, obnoxious,
boring or unromantic tasks is worth the candle. The promise of Title VII is that
132
women are now to be on equal footing.

125. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, supra note 124, at 14,927.
126. Osterman, supra note 76, at 419–20, n. 69.
127. Osterman, supra note 76, at 420.
128. Franklin, supra note 92, at 1333.
129. Franklin, supra note 92, at 1338, 1345.
130. Franklin, supra note 92, at 1345.
131. See generally Weeks v. S. Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 408 F.2d 228, 232–33, 236
(5th Cir. 1969).
132. Id. at 236.
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And in Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 133 the court invalidated the
restrictive state protective legislation that limited women to jobs that did not
require lifting over twenty-five to thirty pounds, and thus opened up new job
opportunities for women. The Ninth Circuit cited to the EEOC’s newly
adopted regulations, noting that the EEOC had taken its position “after
considerable hesitation” but that the EEOC now believes that state laws
inconsistent with the objectives of Title VII must be disregarded, and held that
this interpretation of the statute is entitled to deference. 134 So the opponents of
the ERA and of adding sex to Title VII were correct in predicting this result.
But the reality was that by that time the earlier protective legislation was out of
favor and no longer regarded as needed.
Another consequence of passage of Title VII was that women used
disparate impact theory successfully to challenge height and weight
requirements for other jobs traditionally held by men. Under this method of
proving discrimination, a plaintiff does not have to show that an employer
intended to discriminate against women, just that a neutral rule or qualification
standard had the effect of screening out women disproportionately, and the
standard was not justified by business necessity. 135 For example in Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 136 the Court said the minimum height and weight requirements
used to screen applicants for positions as correctional counselors in the state
penitentiary system had an unlawful disparate impact on women. The Court
was persuaded that the height and weight requirements were not job related.
However, the Court ruled in favor of the Alabama prison system on its other
asserted defense, and held that it had proved that being a man was a BFOQ for
the position because sex offenders were scattered throughout the facility and a
“woman’s ability to maintain order” in such a facility “would be directly
reduced by her womanhood.” 137
Women’s advocates also used Title VII to seek redress for harassment in
the workplace and in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 138 the Supreme Court
held that sexual harassment, if it is sufficiently severe or pervasive, constitutes
discrimination in working conditions on the basis of sex. It is not intuitively
obvious that harassment would be seen as a form of discrimination, in that it
does not necessarily involve a tangible employment action or conduct by a
company official. But in 1980 the EEOC had published guidelines on sex
discrimination explaining that harassment creates discriminatory terms and

133. Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1223, 1227 (9th Cir. 1971).
134. Id. at 1226.
135. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 424–25 (1971) (first describing this type
of claim and proof in a race case challenging a high school diploma requirement for a labor job).
136. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329–31 (1977).
137. Id. at 335–37.
138. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
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conditions of employment that can be actionable under Title VII, 139 and the
Court deferred to the agency’s expertise in ruling in Vinson’s favor.
In another significant sexual harassment case, Harris v. Forklift
Systems, 140 the Court clarified the substantive standard for proving actionable
harassment. The Court held that Title VII is violated when a workplace is
permeated with “discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult” that is
“sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s
employment and create an abusive working environment.” 141 The Court
expressly noted that a plaintiff does not need to prove that the harassment
seriously affected her psychological well-being to prevail. 142 Subsequently, in
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 143 and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 144
the Court explained the rules for holding an employer liable for the harassment
perpetrated by subordinate employees, and held that employers will be strictly
liable if the harassment culminates in a tangible employment action (for
example, if a supervisor fires an employee who refuses his sexual advances;
the type of case previously known as “quid pro quo” harassment). But in cases
of hostile environment harassment, where no tangible actions are taken, the
Court significantly undermined the likelihood that plaintiffs will obtain relief
by creating an affirmative defense that makes it easier for employers to avoid
liability in cases of supervisory harassment. The Court held that an employer
can avoid liability or damages in supervisor harassment cases if it can prove it
had an effective sexual harassment policy and procedure in place at the time of
the harassment, and the plaintiff unreasonably failed to avail herself of those
procedures. 145 Then, in Vance v. Ball State University, 146 the Court made such
cases even more challenging by rejecting the EEOC’s guidance on the point
and adopting a narrow definition of a supervisory employee for purposes of the
Faragher/Ellerth rule, holding that an employee is a supervisor for purposes of
vicarious liability only if he or she is empowered by the employer to take
tangible employment actions against the victim. 147 This result struck Justice
Ginsburg as such a departure from prior agency principles and from the
realities of the workplace that she said at the end of her dissenting opinion,
“The ball is once again in Congress’ court to correct the error into which this
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Court has fallen, and to restore the robust protections against workplace
harassment the Court weakens today.” 148
Litigants also, quite reasonably, argued that discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy constituted sex discrimination. But these arguments were rejected
by the Supreme Court.
PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT
Soon after Title VII was enacted women began to challenge discrimination
on the basis of pregnancy, which many believed was synonymous with sex
discrimination. The EEOC has maintained since 1972 that employment
policies or practices that adversely affect female employees because of
pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions constitute disparate
treatment based on sex. 149 The Supreme Court, however, did not agree with
that analysis when evaluating a constitutional equal protection claim. In
Geduldig v. Aiello, the Court in 1974 held that a state law that excluded from
disability benefits a temporary disability caused by an uncomplicated
pregnancy did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, because such a program
does not discriminate on the basis of sex, but rather simply “divides potential
recipients in two groups—pregnant women and nonpregnant persons.” 150
Women continued to use Title VII to bring challenges to the denial of
benefits for pregnancy and employer policies that denied them maternity leave,
and most lower courts held that Geduldig was not applicable to Title VII,
which the courts thought did prohibit such discrimination. The courts reasoned
that an employer engaged in disparate treatment on the basis of sex if it treated
a temporary incapacity due to pregnancy or childbirth less favorably than a
temporary disability due to any other reason. The Supreme Court disagreed
with this reasoning. Following its logic in Geduldig, the Court decided in 1976
in General Electric v. Gilbert that such exclusions from disability plan
coverage of periods of disability arising from or related to pregnancy are not
sex-based within the meaning of Title VII and cannot even be challenged
under a disparate impact theory as neutral practices that have an impact based
on sex. 151 Similarly in 1977, in Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, the Court held that
it was not unlawful sex discrimination to exclude pregnancy from a sick leave
policy, since that exclusion merely constituted a failure to extend to women a
benefit that men could not and did not receive, although the Court concluded
that the employer violated Title VII by requiring women to forfeit their
seniority on return from a leave necessitated by childbirth. 152

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 2466 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting).
29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (2017).
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496–97 (1974).
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 133–34 (1976).
Nashville Gas Co., v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 139–43 (1977).
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In response to these decisions women’s groups mobilized to seek a
legislative fix. The attorney who represented Gilbert and the class of women
who challenged General Electric’s policy, Ruth Weyand, and many other labor
and civil rights activists, feminists, and women’s organizations, including the
National Organization for Women and the National Partnership for Women
and Families, as well as some right-to-life groups, quickly formed a coalition
called the Campaign to End Discrimination Against Pregnant Workers and
petitioned Congress to amend Title VII to provide that discrimination on the
basis of pregnancy is gender-based discrimination. 153 These women were
incensed that the Court had given this “slap in the face to motherhood.” 154
Congress swiftly responded by passing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
of 1978. The PDA specifically overruled Gilbert’s interpretation of Title VII
by amending the statute to say that “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex”
includes “because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions.” 155 The PDA contains two separate provisions, each
guaranteeing a substantive right. The first is the right against being treated
adversely because of pregnancy; the second is the right to be treated, when
pregnant and unable to work, the same as other employees who are also unable
to work due to temporary disability. As Senator Williams, a sponsor of the Act,
stated: “The entire thrust . . . behind this legislation is to guarantee women the
basic right to participate fully and equally in the workforce, without denying
them the fundamental right to full participation in family life.” 156
The first case under the PDA to reach the Supreme Court involved a claim
of discrimination against men. In Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock
Co. v. EEOC, 157 the EEOC sued Newport News because its health insurance
plan (as amended to comply with the PDA) provided coverage for pregnancyrelated conditions for female employees, but provided only limited coverage of
pregnancy for employees’ wives. The Court focused on the benefits provided
to the spouses of male and female employees, and noted that “the husbands of
female employees receive a specified level of hospitalization coverage for all
conditions; the wives of male employees receive such coverage except for

153. Nicholas Pedriana, Discrimination by Definition: The Historical and Legal Paths to the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 11 (2009).
154. Id.
155. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012). The amendment provides:
(k) The terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ include, but are not limited to,
because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and
women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated
the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe
benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to
work . . . .
156. 123 CONG. REC. 29658 (1977).
157. Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
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pregnancy-related conditions.” 158 This established facial discrimination
because of sex in the literal sense. The Court relied on EEOC guidelines in
reaching its conclusions; the first reiterated a principle of antidiscrimination
law, that an employer is free to provide no benefits, but if it does provide
benefits, it must do so on a nondiscriminatory basis; and the second
distinguished between the level of coverage for employees and for dependents,
stating that under Title VII an employer can choose to cover employees more
fully than dependents, but must cover pregnancy-related conditions of spouses
at the same level as all other conditions of spouses, male or female. 159
The second PDA case to reach the Supreme Court embodied the central
tactical and philosophical controversy among advocates of women’s rights that
remains alive today: that of equal versus special treatment for pregnancy. In
California Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Guerra, the plaintiff
challenged her employer’s refusal to reinstate her in her job when she returned
from a four-month “pregnancy disability leave” mandated by state law. 160 The
state enforcement agency interpreted the leave statute as including a right to
post-leave reinstatement. 161 The employer argued the state law was preempted
by the PDA, and could not stand because it opened employers to charges of
reverse discrimination under Title VII by requiring preferential treatment for
pregnant women. 162 Feminists who embraced the equal treatment approach to
pregnancy argued the PDA literally mandates equal treatment, and that the
employer could achieve the equal treatment required by Title VII without
violating state law if it extended the same leave and reinstatement rights to
non-pregnant employees. Feminists who advocated special treatment of
pregnancy argued that the special characteristics of pregnancy and the realities
it created for women required special accommodations for working women so
that they would not experience job setbacks as a result of becoming parents.
Thus, they argued that the state law was compatible with Title VII’s goal of
equal employment opportunity for women. The Supreme Court concluded that
the PDA established a floor, not a ceiling, on pregnancy benefits, and that the
state statute and the PDA shared the goal of promoting equal employment
opportunity. 163 The majority held that the special leave provided by the
California statute was “narrowly drawn” and therefore did not represent a

158. Id. at 684.
159. Appendix, Questions and Answers on the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 29 C.F.R. §
1604.10 (1979) (codified the EEOC guidelines that the Court used in Newport News Shipbuilding
& Dry Dock Co.).
160. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 272 (1987).
161. Id. at 277.
162. Id. at 279.
163. Id. at 280.
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return to archaic protective legislation that had been based on stereotypical
notions about the abilities of pregnant workers. 164
While Title VII mandates equal treatment of men and women, it creates a
limited exception to the prohibition on discrimination, as mentioned earlier in
discussing Dothard v. Rawlinson. If sex is a BFOQ for a job, an employer may
discriminate on the basis of sex. The BFOQ defense requires a showing that
being of one sex is reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the
particular business or enterprise. In International Union, United Automobile,
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW v. Johnson
Controls, Inc., the third PDA case to reach the Supreme Court, the Court
considered the BFOQ exception in the context of a pregnancy case. 165 Johnson
Controls manufactured batteries and prohibited all fertile women from jobs
involving lead exposure because that exposure was arguably harmful to
developing fetuses. 166 The company defended this “fetal protection” policy on
the basis of moral and ethical concerns for the next generation, and out of
concern for potential tort liability if children of mothers who had been exposed
to lead were born with defects. 167 The Supreme Court justices all agreed the
policy excluding women was discriminatory, the question was whether it was
justified as a BFOQ. The Court concluded the policy obviously discriminated
on the basis of sex and pregnancy and that it could not be saved by the BFOQ
defense because there was no suggestion that potentially or actually pregnant
women were less capable of making batteries than nonpregnant employees. 168
Finally, in Young v. United Parcel Services, Inc., the Court considered a
much more challenging issue of pregnancy discrimination—whether
employers are required to accommodate pregnant women who have temporary
medical restrictions by allowing them to do “light duty” work if such work is
available to others who have temporary disabilities. 169 UPS accommodated
three classes of employees by allowing them to take light duty status if they
had on-the-job injuries, if they had disabilities within the meaning of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, and if they were unable to drive because of
license restrictions, but it did not allow this accommodation to Peggy Young
when her midwife advised her not to lift over 20 pounds. 170 The Court was not
persuaded by the EEOC’s position that the PDA’s second clause requires such
an accommodation whenever an employer has a policy that provides the

164. Id. at 290.
165. See generally Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of
Am., UAW, et al. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
166. Id. at 190.
167. Id. at 206.
168. Id. at 206–207.
169. See generally Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2016).
170. Id. at 1344.
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accommodation to others similar in their inability to work, regardless of the
reason they are unable to work. 171 The Court adopted a narrower rule that
where a pregnant plaintiff shows that others similar to her were
accommodated, the burden shifts to the employer to justify its reasons for the
refusal to accommodate her, and its reason must be something more than that it
would be more expensive or less convenient to accommodate pregnant
women. 172 If the employer explains its reasons, the plaintiff then may
challenge it as a pretext by showing that the employer’s “policies impose a
significant burden on pregnant workers” and the employer’s reasons are “not
sufficiently strong to justify the burden.” 173 Essentially, the Court held that
UPS might have accommodated too many other workers to be able to meet its
burden of proving a valid reason for excluding pregnant workers.
The arguments in the Young case are reminiscent of the divide between
earlier feminists who emphasized arguments based in claims of equality and
those whose arguments were based in claims of difference and the need for
special treatment. Although militant feminists like Alice Paul and other
supporters of the ERA thought protective legislation was injurious to women
and that the rationale for it ran counter to demands for equal treatment under
the law, many of those differences seemed muted in 2016. The needs of
pregnant workers have not really changed in the two centuries women have
been working outside the home, but the willingness of courts to recognize and
respect those needs without indulging in romantic paternalism has undergone
substantial change, thanks to the heroic efforts of women willing to sue to
advance women’s rights to fair and equal treatment, and to the readiness of the
enforcement agencies and members of Congress to step up when necessary.
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act, like Title VII itself and the Equal Pay
Act, provides a microcosmic view of our constitutional system in operation,
revealing the dynamic interplay of congressional legislative enactments,
enforcement agency interpretations, and judicial construction of those
enactments as the law is shaped and reshaped in response to changing
circumstances. The legislative processes were radically different with the three
statutes discussed here, in that the EPA was a carefully constructed enactment
designed in response to a Presidential Commission’s recommendation passed
after two years of hearings and debates; the Title VII sex amendment added a
single word to the statute, was discussed for two hours on the House floor, but
was inserted at the behest of a determined and insistent small group who
fought for it for over 40 years in one form or another; and the PDA was a
specifically targeted statute designed to “overrule” a decision of the Court that
was viewed as wrongheaded by a large and diverse group of activists who
171. Id. at 1351–52.
172. Id. at 1354.
173. Id. at 1354.
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formed an organized effort to get what was needed with surgical precision. The
success of these statutes in transforming the lives of working women cannot be
overstated, but what strikes me as really remarkable is that the intellectual and
emotional arguments advanced by litigants and activists in the last 53 years
mirror or echo the arguments organized feminists first advanced in the early
19th century. And, there is still work to be done.
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